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42 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:17 
and an intellectual orphan to the behavioral revolution in historical 
methodology. 
ROBERT FAULKNER13 
The next task for constitutional scholarship, it seems to me, 
remains the grand old task kept alive by a few scholars: taking the 
Constitution seriously. Preserving the general government in its 
constitutional vigor and limits, and individual rights in their Consti-
tutional extent, was long understood to be the constitutional duty of 
officials. It should also be the lodestar of American students of law 
and politics. So to speak in 1987, however, subjects one to bitter 
attacks, not to mention ridicule. An orientation by the original 
Constitution is repudiated in effect by a majority of the Supreme 
Court-and openly by most judges and scholars. It has become a 
party matter, and Attorney General Meese's exhortation to abide 
by original intent has evoked a torrent of indignant repudiation. 
Another sign: the Bicentennial seems unenthusiastically backed, 
awkwardly excused, and just plain embarrassing to most judges and 
legal scholars. It is something like the exhumation of a distin-
guished elder whom a zealous village establishment would like 
thought dead of natural causes. 
There continue to appear, of course, first-rate studies consider-
ing the prudent application of constitutional provisions. I think of 
Robert Scigliano's examination of "The War Powers Resolution 
and the War Powers" (in The Presidency in the Constitutional Order 
(J. Bessette & J. Tulis ed. 1981)), Robert Steamer's assessment of 
the Chief Justices (Chief Justice (1986), James W. Ceaser's Presi-
dential Selection (1979), and James Q. Wilson's "Does the separa-
tion of powers still work?" (The Public Interest, Winter 1987). If 
other scholars take such works as models, we should rejoice. 
There are grave obstacles to such a happy future, however. 
First and foremost is the dominant progressive scholarship of more 
than a half-century, which has declared obsolete the old constitu-
tionalism of limited government and equality of opportunity. It is 
now joined to a bastard relative disillusioned with progress and yet 
determined to progress beyond. Radical or rad-lib scholars are at 
once politically complacent, since they are assured that history has 
disposed of the merits of the old, and politically zealous or pecu-
liarly principled, since they suppose that equal dignity and libera-
tion are alone right and historically fitting. We face a scholarly mix 
of historical assurance and moral zealotry that inclines to corrode 
13. Professor of Political Science, Boston College. 
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all political authority, including constitutional institutions. Skepti-
cal about governmental and economic hierarchies, permissive about 
traditional morality, the mixture caters to the hollow idealist and 
the crowd. It promotes an idealistic universalism that barely covers 
a weak political nihilism ("peace," "respect for all lifestyles," "non-
judgmental"), and that encourages the perennial democratic aver-
sions to authority, foresight, civic virtue, and self-restraint. Gov-
erning becomes harder and guilt-ridden; indulgence and vice, easier 
and loud. Big subsidies, big deficits, a weakened presidency, bluff 
and weakness abroad, the power of public opinion and the media, 
democratization of elections and of the Congress, vulgar public 
taste, the erosion of families and real community-follow or are 
aided. This is the crisis of American constitutionalism. 
Scholars can help by defense, by attack, and, in both, by wise 
constitutional exposition. They can defend the old constitutional-
ism by accounts of particular institutions and of the general work-
ing of our constitutional republic. In such a spirit historical studies 
are indispensable-for we need to recover what is disdained or for-
gotten. More obviously useful are applications of constitutional 
principles to practical problems-such as the extent of Congress's 
rightful controls over executive war making, or over legislative re-
districting. Judges and lawyers do it every day; the problem is to 
encourage them, as Walter Berns has done, to take seriously consti-
tutionalism, rather than an ignoble and impolitic egalitarianism. 
Last, but not least, one must reveal the foolishness of the enemy. 
One must show the difference between preoccupation with the sta-
tus of the so-called disadvantaged, and the real health of individual 
rights, of equality of opportunity, of school, city, and church, of the 
economy, and of, in general, a constitutional republic or democracy. 
NORMAN ROSENBERQ14 
When considering "What Next?" in constitutional history, a 
1987 New Republic piece, decrying scholarship-overload and pro-
posing a partial moratorium on publication of "new" works, came 
to mind. The journal's editors, foregoing Crit-bashing for a mo-
ment, singled out sociology as the most egregious example of hyper-
publication, but many of us living in the aftermath of the Bicenten-
nial may have briefly thought that constitutional history could pro-
vide an appropriate area in which to test the feasibility of a limited 
Anti-Publication Control Treaty or ABCT. (The more descriptive 
14. Professor of History, Macalester College. 
